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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
A. RULON JACKSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

GHANT R. CALDWELL, LEON
H. JACKSON, LOYD J.
CAMPBELL AND LOWELL
D. NIELSON,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
10389

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE

This is an action by the plaintiff against the
<lefendants, all of whom were former partners of
a parLnership known as Messina, Jackson, Caldwell
& Company, which proceeded upon plaintiff's amended complaint, defendants' answer thereto, defenda11ts' amended counterclaim and plaintiff's reply,
<111 involving relief sought by the respective parties
in connection with the existence of said partneri-:hip, the termination thereof on March 31, 1962,
and the final accountings between the parties incidC'nt to the completion of all the business and affairs of said partnership.
1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The ~ase was tried to the Court. From a judg.
ment holdmg, among other things, that the partnership of Messina, Jackson, Caldwell & Company
legally and lawfully terminated as to all partie·~
on March 31, 1962, pursuant to written notict
dated April 3, 1961, given to plaintiff by defendants and pursuant to the terms and conditions of
the partnership agreement of April 1, 1958, amended as of April 1, 1959; that there was no duty upon
either plaintiff or defendants to account under those
certain agreements made and executed by the plaintiff and defendants dated March 7, 1960, and April
21, 1960; that a proper, fair and equitable division
of the assets of the terminated partnership of Messina, Jackson, Caldwell & Company was effectuated and completed between plaintiff and defendants as of March 30, 1962; that there was no continuity in the old terminated partnership as a business entity in any respects by either plaintiff or
defendants after March 31, 1962, the date of term·
ination thereof, and there was no duty upon either
plaintiff or defendants to preserve the old partnership, or any part or portion thereof, subsequent
to March 31, 1962; that under the facts and cir·
cumstances of this action, there was no intangiblr
asset of the old terminated partnership in the form
of good will for which the defendants are in any
manner responsible for or accountable to plaintiff.
or for which plaintiff is entitled to any compensa2

tion; that defendant, Grant R. Caldwell, has propl'rly, lawfully and timely accounted to plaintiff with
resped to the work in process and other minor
unfinished business of the terminated partnership
and has deposited the funds determined to be due
and owing to plaintiff pursuant to said accounting
in a trust fund; that the division of the work in
prrn.:ess of the old partnership as of March 31, 1962,
on an individual client basis as shown and set forth
in Exhibit D-32, is proper, fair and equitable; that
plaintiff is chargeable to the old partnership for its
investment in the work in process prior to March
81, 1962, on accounts that went from the old terminated partnership to plaintiff's firm of Jackson,
Maxwell & Company and he must account to defendants therefore; that there was no conspiracy of any
kind or nature on the part of the defendants to deprive plaintiff of his interest in the partnership
of Messina, Jackson, Caldwell & Company; that
defendants, or one or more of them, did not in any
manner commit any tortious or unlawful acts
against plaintiff or breach any fiduciary obligations or duties owed to him; that defendants, or any
of them, did not violate or breach any agreement,
en· agreements, with plaintiff, or at any time neglect
or fail to cooperatively carry on the partnership
priol' to March 31, 1962; that plaintiff's interest
in the partnership is fully set forth in said partnership agreement of April 1, 1958, amended as of
.\pril 1, 1959, that there was no expulsion, tortious
3

otherwise, of plaintiff fi·om said partnership, 111
any partnership; that there is no evidence that pbi 11 .
tiff became disabled on Ap1·il 1, 1962; that tlh
final consummation of the affafrs of the old pannership be uncle1taken and completed by plaintiff
and defendants in accordance with the partnership agreement of April 1, 1958, amended as oJ
Ap1·il 1, 1959; that plaintiff failed to meet thr preponde1·ance of evidence to sustain any of his cause~
of action; that there was no evidence to sustain
defendants amended counte1·claim; and that no interest be allowed on any amounts determined tri
be owing fi·om defendants to plaintiff, or from
plaintiff to defendants, 01· from plaintiff ancl clcfendants to the estate of Marco Messina, deceased.
Plaintiff appealed.
01·

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff, Appellant, states that he seeks reversal of the judgment in certain respects and for
appropriate orders as follows, to-wit:
A.

Determining that the defendants apprnvria ted the bulk of the clients of the firm of
Messina, Jackson, Caldwell, & Company
during the term of the partnership ancl
that defendants converted a valuable asset
of the firm, to-wit: the good will of tlw
firm, in relevant respects, to the exclusi(lll
of plaintiff.
4

H.

That the plaintiff, appellant, is entitled
to an accounting for the value of the good
will inherent in the client-accountant relationship with respect to all of the clients
of said firm.

C.

That plaintiff is entitled to certain adjustments in the allocation of work in process
of the firm of Messina, Jackson, Caldwell
& Company, as of March 31, 1962.

D.

Alte1·natively, plaintiff is entitled to damages in accordance with the provisions of
a partnership agreement between the parties dated March 7, 1960.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants controvert plaintiff's Statement of
Facts as substantially excluding material and relecant evidence; as being inconsistent with the facts;
and that unti·ue and unfair inferences are presented
thereby. Defendants submit their Statement of
F:icts as follows:
Prim· to the commencement of this action,
plaintiff, defendants and Marco Messina, now de(·rased, were engaged in business in a partnership
as public accountants, the name of which was Messina, Jackson, Caldwell & Company. The last partnp1·ship agreement entered into by the parties to
1
his ::iction and said Marco Messina, was elated
.\pril 1, 1958, amended as of April 1, 1959. (Ex!111Jit P-4).

5

Sai~ partne1~ship agreement provided, among
other thmgs and m relevant part, that in the event
of the death of said Marco Messina, plaintiff, A.
Rulon Jackson, or defendant, Grant R. Caldwell
the partnership should nonetheless continue until
the close of the second fiscal year after the fisral
year in which such death occurred, (March 31
1962), and that the estate o rheirs of the decedent
shall be entitled to the same participation between
the date of death and the effective date of termination of the partnership as the decedent would have
received had he continued to live and participate
in the partnership (Art. IX, page 7, of Exhibit P-4).
The said partnership conducted business on a fis.
cal year basis commencing April 1, through March
31, of the following year. Said Marco Messina died
on August 16, 1959.
I

After the death of said Marco Messina, plaintiff and defendants continued to operate the partnership under the name of 1\/Iessina, Jackson, Caldwell & Company, pursuant to the terms and condi·
tions of said partnership agreement of April 1.
1958, amended as of April 1, 1959, until the e~rl
of the second fiscal year after the fiscal year in
which the death of Mr. Messina occurred, or until
March 31, 1962, at which date the partnership ter~11·
inated as to all parties pursuant to written notice
dated April 3, 1961, duly given to plaintiff by de·
fendants (Exhibit P-11), and pursuant to the terms
and conditions of said partnership agreement.
6

In March, 1960, plaintiff and defendants exrcnted aYi agreement which was received in evidence as Exhibit P-5. This particular agreement
recited that the parties recognized their obligations
to the Messina Estate under the last partnership
:,greernent entered into by plaintiff and defendants
and Marco Messina dated April 1, 1958, amended
as of April 1, 1959 (Exhibit P-4). Said agreement
of March 7, 1960, provided for reinstatement of
certain provisions relating to permanent disability
which were contained in the 1958 agreement (Exhibit P-3) but which were removed in their entirety
from the 1959 agreement (Exhibit P-4) executed
by all of the parties and in effect at the time of
J\fr. Messina's death and also in effect, with no
modification in this regard, as of March 31, 1962.
Subsequent to the death of Mr. Messina, discontentment arose among the partners and employees regarding management and other matters. Beginning about January 1961, conferences and meeting were held in an effort to seek some solution to
the problems. Nothing constructive was accomplished (R. 411 to 418 inclusive). During the meetings
ancl discussions, and at later meetings and discussions, plaintiff was repeatedly advised by Mr. Caldwell that with respect to the partnership he could
have any account in the office; that he could have
any employee; and that he could have the office
:>pace then under lease (R. 330, 420, 422). Plainliff rejected these offers and continued to devote
7

substantially all of his time to his own person l
business matters, as he had for several past year:
and commencing about January, 1961, gradual]\'.
withdrew from active partnership participation (R.
252, 253, 414 & 415). The situation at this time
as explained by Mr. Caldwell was one of complete
dissention and impossibilty. (R. 411 & 412) Further
discussions were had as to a possible purchase of
plaintiff's interest in the partnership, but he rejected these offers.
Defendants finally gave plaintiff formal written notice of the termination of the partnership a~
of March 31, 1962, by instrument dated April 3,
1951,and received in evidence as Exhibit P-11.
Following receipt of said written notice dated
April 3, 1961, plaintiff and defendant, Grant R.
Caldwell, agreed that upon the termination of the
partnership on March 31, 1962, the clients and accounts were to be allowed to follow the accountants
of their choice; that no solicitation of clients or accounts would be made by any party; and that the
situation would remain in the status quo until
March 31, 1962. (R. 422 and 423). No solicitati011
of any clients or accounts was made by defendants,
or any of them, at any time. ( R. 254, 422 and 423).
Mr. Paul J. Maxwell was an employee of the
old partnership. Plaintiff formed a business relationship with Mr. Maxwell during the first part
of January, 1962, some three months prior to tbi

111ination. (R 447). Immediately thereafter, Mr.
;\la:-;well terminated his employment wit hthe old
partnership, took certain clients and accounts and
1hPil' files and records with him, and opened offices
in tht> Judge Building, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R
·~;)4, 255, 421, 422). Notwithstanding the under::;Urnding of the parties with respect to solicitation
of clients and accounts, plaintiff and his wife commenced to solicit and continued to solicit clients
:rnd accounts of the old partnership to be serviced
by Mr. Maxwell. (R 312 to 316, inclusive). Plaintiff and Mr. Maxwell formalized their business rebtionship into a formal partnership to function as
a public accounting organization during the month
of May, 1962. ( R 453).
t('l

Immediately upon the termination of the old
partnership on March 31, 1962, plaintiff and defrnclant, Grant R. Caldwell, met and agreed upon
a division of the assets of the said partnership. The
cli\'ision was made as of March 31, 1962, and was
approved by the other defendants. (Exhibit D-38)
(R. ,109, 410, 411). Plaintiff immediately thereafter
l'emoved all of those items selected by him, including the files and working papers of those clients and
accounts of the old partnership who chose to go with
him and not theretofore taken by plaintiff or Mr.
Maxwell, from the offices of the old partnership
in said First Security Building to plaintiff's offices
in the Judge Building where he continued the business relationship theretofore fo1·rnecl with said Paul
9

J. Maxwell to service such clients and accounts as
Jackson, Maxwell & Company, public accountants
At the time of the division, plaintiff did not
mention or make any reference to any breach of anv
contract, did not assert that he was permanent!~
disabled, or make any demands upon defendant's
of any kind or nature but the matter of immediate
concern was to divide the assets to enable plaintiff
to pursue his business relationship with Ml'. Max.
well formed in January, 1962, to service those clients and accounts who chose to go with the mrather
than remain with defendants, one of whom is plaintiff's brother (R. 423). Plaintiff's wife testified
that she hoped plaintiff could re-establish himself
in the accounting business at this time. (R 315).
Defendants, certain of the employees and Mr.
Nicholas Rhodes, a former individual practitioner,
immediately formed a new business relationship ,
to service those clients and accounts of the old partnership who chose to go with them rather than with
plaintiff and Mr. Maxwell.
Certain work in process remained unfinished
as of March 31, 1962, with respect to certain clients and accounts who chose to go with defendants
rather than with plaintiff's new firm of .Jackson,
Maxwell & Company. Defendants thereafter co1:1•
pleted said work in process and prepared and mail·
ed billings therefor. Defendant, Grant R. Caldwell,
thereafter prepared a detailed accounting with re·
10

:,pPd to the work in process on an individual client-

account basis setting forth therein the division of
the work in process between plaintiff, defendants
and the estate of Marco Messina, deceased. The original accounting covering the division of the work
in process was received in evidence as Exhibit P-14.
Although plaintiff was requested on many occasions to make suggestions as to the procedure he
felt should be followed in making a division of the
work in process and other minor unfinished business, he declined and ref used to do so.
As soon as the work in process matter was
completed, defendant, Grant R. Caldwell, immediately thereafter prepared a detailed accounting with
respect to the work in process based upon said
Exhibit P-14, and with respect to all of the other
minor unfinished business as of March 31, 1962,
and furnished said accounting to plaintiff. (Exhibit P-15). The funds determined to be due and
owing to plaintiff pursuant to said accounting were
deposited in a trust fund at that time by defendant,
Grant R. Caldwell, and have remained in such account ever since ( R. 256 and 257) pending receipt
of an accounting from plaintiff with respect to the
work in process on those clients and accounts who
chose to go with plaintiff in order that all pending
matters, including the accountings, could finally be
consummated.
It was necessary for defendants to continue to
utilize the accounts receivable ledger of the old
11

firm until a time when the work in process as of
March 31, 1962, could be completed and billed and
accountings to plaintiff and the Messina Estate
properly prepared therefrom. To have done othe!'wise would have resulted in an unnecessary duplication of work by reason of the Messina Estate also
being entitled to an accounting with respect to the
work in process as of March 31, 1962, based upon
billings for the first three months next succeeding
March 31, 1962. (R. 256, 257, Exhibit P-4).
Concurrently with the furnishing to plaintiff
of said accounting last referred to above, defendant,
Grant R. Caldwell, requested therein that plaintiff
furnish him with an accounting with respect to those
accounts who chose to go with plaintiff's new firm
of Jackson, Maxwell & Company in order that the
final accounting among plaintiff, defendants and
the estate of Marco Messina, deceased, could be
consummated. Plaintiff failed and refused to furnish any such accounting.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE PREPONDERATES THAT UNDER THE FACTS AND CIBCU~
STANCES OF THIS CASE THERE WAS NO INTAliG- ,
IBLE ASSET OF THE OLD TERMINATED PARTNERSHIP OF MESSINA, JACKSON, CALDWELL & COM·
PANY IN THE FORM OF GOOD WILL FOR WHICH
THE DEFENDANTS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR OR ACCOUNTABLE TO PLAINTIFF . . .

A.

·11

The status of the law in regard to good wi
as an asset as a professional partnership.
12

Defendants have not been able to find any case
involving the general application of the principle
which has been presented to the Supreme Court of
the State of Utah and therefore the matter appears
to be an open question in this state.
The substantial weight of authority in this
country is to the effect that no value can be attached to the good will of a professional partnership,
although there are some cases to the contrary based
upon particular facts and circumstances.
40 Am. Jur., Partnership, Section 271, page
316, states as follows:
"'Professional Partnerships." The general rule is that a professional
partnership the reputation of which depends
on the individual skill of the members, such
as partnerships of attorneys or physicians,
has no goo dwill to be distributed as a firm
asset on its dissolution."
An annotation on the subject found at 44
A.L.R. 524, states as follows:
like.

"III.

Professional partnerships, or the

"The general rule is that a professional
partnership the reputation of which depends
on the individual skill of the members, such
as partnerships of attorneys or physicians,
has no good will to be distributed as a firm
asset on its dissolution. Witkowsky v. Affeld
( 1918) 283 Ill. 557, 119 N.E. 630; McCall
v. Moshocowitz ( 1886) 10 N.Y. Civ. Proc.
13

Rep. 107; Masters v. Brooks ( 1909) 13'> A .
Div. 874, 117 N.Y. Supp. 585 · H~lden; fj;'
1!,a~in ( 184 7) 1 Pars. Sel.
Cas. (Pa.;
2 ~ 0, Slack v. Suddoth ( 1899) 102 Tenn. 37.i
4n L.R.A. 589, 73 Am. St. Rep. 881 52 01\··
180;***."
' ' ' ·1 ·

Eq.

A later annotation on the subject found at 6~
A.L.R. 529, states as follows:
-

. "5. Where good will is personal to individual partner or attached to his incli\ idual
property.
"It is sometimes found, especially with
respect to professional partnerships, that the
good will of the business is primarily attached
to the persons of the individual partners and
necessarily attends each partner's personality
upon a dissolution, so that there is no separate 'partnership good will' which can be accounted for.
"The general rule is that a professional
partnership, the reputation of which depends
on the individual skill of the members, such
as partnership of attorneys or physici~ns,
has no good will to be distributed as a fmn
asset on dissolution, said the court in Cool; L'8.
Lauten (1954) 1 Ill. App. 2d 255, 117 N.~.
2d 414, holding that a partnership of certi·
fied public accountants came under thr same
rule, the court saying that this was e.spec1-

B.

1

1

ally so where there was no provision rn _th,~
partnership agreement relating to good w1//.
The Partnership Agreement.
Plaintiff, while overlooking entirely the ~a~t '

that the pertinent partnership agreement ( Exhibii
14

P-0 itself does not list "good will" among the
a:::sets uf the partnership, attempts by a rather
tortuous chain of reasoning to equate the amount
paid by the partnership to the Estate of Marco
Messina \vith a valuation of the partnership good
will. In fact, plaintiff takes the position that the
entire compensation paid to Mr. Messina after he
died was in recognition of the fact that he had
brought to the firm accounts which in themselves
had value. This argument, of course, overlooks entil'eley the clear picture made by the evidence in
this case of the role of Mr. Messina in the firm
before his death. Mr. Messina was the managing
partner. ( R. 220) He directed the work of the other
partners and of the employees of the firm. He maintained the contacts with the clients for the purpose
of assuring that the work was performed satisfactorily. ( R. 220) Mr. Messina was no free-loader
resting upon the fact that he had brought clients
into the firm. He was in all respects a contributing, wm·king, active partner. Certainly, it would
be folly to say that in a corporation management
contributed nothing to the operation except the possession of good will. Why then should such an argument be made in regard to a managing partner?
Furthermore, the provision in the last partnership
agreement executed by the parties and Mr. Messina
1·egarding the participation of Mr. Messina's estate
in the partnership profits for the pertinent period
i1wolved has absolutely nothing to do with the valu15

ation of any intangible (Exhibit P-4). It must
be conceded that this is quite a common provision
in partnership contracts and in employment contracts of business organizations other than partnerships. It is not a valuation of good will, but simply
a death benefit which is part of present compens~
tion and which is spoken of in the language of industry as "fringe benefits."
The partnership agreement in effect at the
time of the termination of the partnership (Exhibit
P-4) as well as the next preceding partnership
agreement (Exhibit P-3) lists the capital assets of
the firm. No mention is made of good will. The
items listed are as follows:
Cash in Banks
Accounts receivable
Work in process
Notes and other receivables
Furniture, fixtures and equipment
(net after depreciation)
Deposit with airline
Investments (stocks)
It is also to be noted that in all of the partnership agreements in evidence the parties and ML
Messina specifically excluded good will as an asset
in computing the book value of a deceased partn:r:s
capital account. (Exhibit P-1, Art. VIII; Exhibit
P-2 Art. X; Exhibit P-3, Art. X; Exhibit P-4, Art.
IX)' All of these agreements, except Exhibit P-4,
were prepared by plaintiff who was and is a member of the Utah State Bar. (R. 227).
16

40 Am. J ur.; Partnership, Sec. 270, page 315,

st 8 tes as follows :

"Good will. Upon the dissolution of a copartnership, nothing being agreed as to the
disposition of the good will of the business,
it remains the property of the individual
members of the firm. If each thereafter continues to pursue the same business, each may
lawfully make such use of it as will best subserve his several interests."
40 Arn. Jur., Partnership, Section 270, citing

authorities, further provides as follows:

"Of course in particular instances it may
appear that the good will of the firm is without value. Where this is shown to be the case
there is no necessity for accounting for it.
Furthermore, the partners may contract that
the good will of the firm is not to be considered as an asset in winding up its affairs, or
that, on the withdrawal of a member, it is
to go to the remaining members without any
accounting for it. An agreement to this effect, express or implied, will be enforced. And
when, on the dissolution of a partnership, the
former members separate and no one appropriates the good will of the firm, there need
be no accounting for this item."
Nor does the Uniform Partnership Act contain
any indication that a valuation shall be assigned
lo good will upon dissolution. Sec. 48-1-37, U.C.A.,
1953 provides in part as follows:
"In settling accounts between the partners after dissolution, the following rules
17

shall be observed, subject to any agreement to the contrary:
( 1) The assets of the partnership are:
(a) The partnership property.
(b) The contributions of the partners necessary for the p:wmen t of all the liabilities
specified in subdivision (2)
of this section . . ."
In the case of Cook v. Lauten, supra, the Comt
held that a professional partnership, upon its dissolution, had no good will to be accounted for as an
asset in the absence of a provision in the partnership agreement relating to good will as an asset.
The following annotation is found at 65 A.L.R.
2d 541 covering a situation where a partnership
contract makes no provision for the valuation of
good will:
"A partnership agreement which provided that a surviving partner could purchase
the interest of the decedent for its 'book
value' was held in Succession of Jmisich
( 1953) 224 La 325, 69 So 2d 361, to relien
the surviving partner from any duty to account to the defendant's estate for the valLie
of the good will of the business, which wa'
not carried on the books of the company as
an asset.
"A provision in the articles. that upon
dissolution the good will of the busn:ess sho~I~
not be considered a part of the capital effect.
of the partnership, but that each p~rt.11 ~ 1
should be at liberty to carry on a srnulc:i
18

business in his own or other name not simila1·
to 01· identical with the name of the firm
was given effect in O'Donnel v. McLoughli~
(1956) 386 Pa 187, 125 A2d 370, the court
holding that in the circumstances it was improper to order a sale of the business as a going concern, including its good will and the
right to continue the use of the firm name,
since while it might be conceded that the good
will and firm name were valuable assets, their
disposition was a proper subject of contract
between the partners."
"Where the deceased partner had concurred in the practice of not carrying good
will as an asset on the partnership books and
had agreed to a contract provision that upon
the death of any of the partners the others
might purchase his interest on the basis of
the valuation of the assets from the books,
it was held in Re Randall's Estate ( 1947)
29 \i\Tash 2d 447, 188 P2d 71, that the surviving partners were entitled to enforce this
agreement notwithstanding the fact that the
good will might have been the most valuable
asset of the business and as a result the decedent's estate received only a small amount
of his actual interest in the business."
"And in a number of other cases the
courts have given effect to partnership agreements providing that good will should not be
taken into account upon dissolution brought
about by the death of one of the partners. See
Minoff v. Margetts (1951) 14 NJ Super 30,
81 A2d 369, certif den 7 NJ 584, 83 A2d 381;
Sands v. Miner (1897) 16 App Div 347, 44
NYS 894, affd 160 NY 693, 55 NE 1100,

* * *"

19

The following annotation is found at 47 A.L.R.
2d 1429, also covering a situation where a partnership contract makes no provision for the valuation
of good will :
"As the meaning of 'book value' is gorerned by the terms of the contract, the term
does not include good will where the partnership agreement expressly eliminates it as an
item to be considered in computing such value.
Minoff v. Margetts ( 1951) 14 N.J. Super 30
81 A2d 369, certif den 7 N.J. 584, 83 A2c\
381; Sands v. Miner ( 1897) 16 App Div 347,
44 NYS 894, affd 160 NY 693, 55 NE 1100;
Soechtig v. Amick ( 1955) 285 App Div 701.
140 NYS2d 85.
"Good will has been excluded as a component item of book value also where there
appeared to be no satisfactory basis for assigning a value to it, or there was no showing that
the partnership agreement contemplated that
it should be included in computing book value.
"Thus, the exclusion of good will as an
item of value was held to have been proper in
Re Witkind's Estate ( 1938) 167 Misc 885,
4 NYS2d 933, under a partnership agreement
providing for the valuation of the interest of
a deceased partner as of the date of his death
'from the books of the partnership', where
there was no evidence indicating the existence
of any good will of more than nominal value.
"Under provision of a partnership ag~·ee
ment giving the surviving partner the ng~t
to buy the interest of a deceased partner 111
the partnership business at its then ~~oh
value, it was held in Succession of Juns1ch
20

( 195:)) 224 La 325, 69 So.2d 361, that the
g' ,od will of the firm should not be included

111 fixing the value of such interest where
there was no good will account on the books
an cl no value for good will was shown on the

books."

C. 1'/ie rvidence with respect to the value of good
1cil1, if any.

The plaintiff has completely failed to establish
a market value of the good will, if any, represented
by the dients and accounts served by Messina, Jackson, Caldwell & Company. The testimony of Donald
J. Pickett, plaintiff's "expert witness," can only
be summed up as that of a witness attempting to
sustain a preconceived result. He endeavored to
establish the good will of the partnership as being
worth 100 per cent of the preceding years' annual
gross fees after minor adjustment for non-recurring
accounts. (R. 359) This, he stated, was the pre,·ailing price in this community for the good will of
an accounting partnership. ( R. 348 and 349). Yet,
he testified that he knew of only a few sales in the
community, one of which he purchased himself on
a retained billing basis ( R. 372) from B. Leland
Tanner, who moved from Utah to California; another involving a purchase from Nielson & Watts
to Elwood & Barnes, the terms of which he only
determined "generally"; another involving a purr:hase by Nielson & Psarras from Mr. Soltis; and
another involving a sale of the practice of Theron
Keel to Mr. Kirkham. Mr. Pickett testified he bid on
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the two sales and purchases last above refened to·
that the lost the bids; and that all of these mattel's
were taken into his considered expert opinion as tri
the value of the accounts served by Messina, Jad.
son, Caldwell & Company. (R. 352 to 356, inclusive).
With respect to his own earlier partnership arrangement with Mr. Keith Barnett (R. 373), he
also testified that upon dissolution of the pal'tnership on June 15, 1964, (R. 375) that in splitting
up each of them simply took the clients and accounts
that he could ( R. 380) ; that the clients simply went
where they wanted to go ( R. 379) ; and that insofai
as the value of the accounts was concerned, neither
he nor Mr. Barnett determined any such value on
the basis of 100 per cent of any previous years' billings in their final settlernen t. ( R. 380).
In order to test the credibility of Mr. Pickett'2
judgment, defendants requested Mr. Psarras and
Mr. Kirkham to testify regarding their respective
purchases. Mr. Psarras testified that his arrange·
ment with the Soltis estate was absolutely not on
the basis of any gross fees for any period of exist·
ence, but solely on the basis of retained business,
being 30 per cent the first year, 25 per cent ~he
second year, and 20 per cent the third, of the billings as collected. Mr. Psarras, who is also an experienced certified public accountant, testifi~d that
11
no reasonable value of accounts could be fixed '.
any prior years' billings and that the relationshi]J
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bctvveen the accountant and his client is such that
it is primarily contingent upon the services rendered
by the individual to the client and the personal relationship established by the individual to the client
am1 once the practitioner is no longer there to serve
the client, a new relationship exists. (R. 561 to 563,
inclusive).

Mr. Kirkham, President of L.D.S. Business College and a partner in the firm of Cope, W angsgard
& Kirkham, testified that Mr. Teel died in an airplane accident and that he personally purchased
the Teel practice for $2,500.00, of which the sum
of $1,250.00 was allocated to library, furniture and
fixtures and the sum of $1,250.00 to the value of
the business retained. With respect to the previous
year's billings of Mr. Teel, he testified that he paid
"ten cents on the dollar hoping to retain at least
that much business." (R. 566, 567). Therefore, if
any amount could conceivably be awarded for good
will, the only realistic evidence as to local custom
is this one isolated sale which establishes it at only
10 pPr cent. Even with respect to this isolated sale,
it is to be noted that by reason of Mr. Teel being
deceased any possibility of competition for the accounts was completely eliminated.
It is also significant to note that Mr. Pickett
apparently thought so little of his opinion of the
\'alue of accounts, which he testified to be worth
lOo per cent of the previous years' annual gross fees
that he even failed to bid high enough to purchase
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the Teel accounts which were sold for "ten cents
th e d o11 ar " ~n d , as men boned
·
above, by reason· onof
~~· Teel bemg deceased, any possibility of compe.
tit10n for the accounts was completely eliminatec.l

A proper standard for the value of accounts
if any, would seem to be the amount a third parti'.
purchaser would have been willing to pay therefo;.
on March 31, 1962. Keeping in mind that the loyalties of the accounts were attached to the twelve individuals, including plaintiff and Mr. Caldwell
working for the old firm, all of whom had to earn
a living from the proceeds of the clients and all of
whom were going to continue in the accounting
business, it is submitted that the evidence confirms
that no purchaser could have been found who was
willing to pay any price for the business.
I

It must be conceded that the opinion of an expert witness, such as Mr. Pickett, is dependent upon
and is no stronger than the facts upon which it i8
predicated. The opinion has no probative force unless the premises upon which it is based are true.
A review of Mr. Pickett's testimony can only lead
to the inescapable conclusion that the basis of his
qualifications was defeated; the assumptions he
made about prior transactions in the community
were 90 per cent in error; he was shown to have
an interest in the case which was anything but objective; and certain of the information ( Exhibi'.s
P-21 and P-22) (R. 507) upon which he based his
opm10n, as prepared by Karl Maxwell, was erron·
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enn:s and incomplete. ( R. 495 to 503, inclusive).

D. The facts and circumstances of this case preclude any allowance for good will.
ln addition to the fact that the parties have
Rpecifically excluded good will as an asset of the
old partnership in all of the partnership agreements
(Exhibits P-1; P-2; P-3; P-4; and P-5), there is no
case which has been referred to by the plaintiff
which would support the award to the plaintiff
for any amount at all for good will under the facts
and circumstances in the subject case. The cases
and authorities relied upon by the plaintiff are of
little assistance in this case. The case of Halverson
v. Walker ( 1910) 28 Utah 262, 112 P. 804, involves
the good will in the sale of one-half interest in a
b:trber shop; the case of Vercimak v. Ostoich ( 1950)
118 Utah 253, 221 P. 2d 602, involves the good will
of a beer parlor; the case of Miller v. Hall, 65 Cal.
App. 2d 200, 150 P. 2d 287, which plaintiff states
quoted with approval certain language fro mthe
case of Hutchins v. Page, 204 Mass. 284, 90 NE
565, 134 Am. St. Rep. 656, involves the good will
of a brokerage firm dealing in stocks, bonds, and
securities and the good will of a manufacturing
business, respectively; the case of Ruppe v. Utter,
76 Cal. App. 19, 243 P. 715, involves the good will
of a general undertaking, embalming and funeral
directing business; the case of Smith v. Bull, 325
P. 2d 463, involves the good will of an advertising
bn,,iness; and the case of Bergum v. Weber, 288 P.
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~d 623, involves th: good will of a business engaged

m the manufacturmg of loop and wire ties.

The sole case relied on by plaintiff which actu.
~lly involves the. g~neral application of the principal '
is the case of William J. Evans v. Frank A. Gmrni}J,
135 A. 2d 128, 65 ALR 2d 513; ...... DeL __ ., 135
A. 2d 134, 65 ALR 2d 520. The Evans v. Gunni}J
case involved an accounting of partnership assets
by a retired partner (Evans) against the rernainingpartner ( Gunnip). The partnership was one of pub~ !
lie accountants and, upon Evans withdrawal, all of
the assets of the partnership were transferred by
Gunnip to a new partnership, Gunnip, Isaacson &
Stolper, of which he was a member. It was prnved
that in the partnership agreement between Gunnip,
Isaacson & Stolper, the value of Gunnip's interest
in the good will of the partnership was fixed at
$100,000 with a proviso that Gunnip would receive
75 per cent therof upon his withdrawal from the
partnership. It was also shown that at the time
Evans left, Gunnip agreed to shortly give Evans
a statement of the financial condition of the partnership upon which the accounting was to be made.
This was never done. While there appear to be
superficial resemblances between the Evans v. Giin·
nip case and the subject case, on the fundamental
proposition upon which the matter turns, they are
diametrically opposed.
In both cases an accounting partnership is involved. In both cases the partnership was termin26

,1tecl because one partner did not desire to continue

in association with the other partner. However, at
this point any similarity ceases. In the subject case,
the defendants informed plaintiff that they would
not continue the partnership arrangement after
March 31, 1962, but that no effort would be made
by them to persuade any of the firm's clients and
accounts to accompany them into their new association. The evidence is to the effect that it was agreed
that the clients and accounts of the firm could go
wherever such clients and accounts desired without
any pressure being exerted, and indeed the evidence
is to the effect that no pressure was exerted by the
defend an ts ( R. 422 and 423). The sole and only
action taken by Mr. Caldwell and his associates to
inform clients and accounts regarding the new situation was a formal announcement of the formation
of a new partnership. (Exhibit P-10). On the other
hand, Mr. Jackson, principally through his wife,
made efforts to solicit clients and accounts of the
old partnership for his new partnership being formc{l at the time with Mr. Paul J. Maxwell (R. 312
to 316, inclusive). Mr. Caldwell made every effort
to advise a particular client whom he thought would
want to go with Mr. Jackson of his new status and
informing the client that he could come in and pick
up the pertinent files, (Exhibit D-46).
The significant part of the Evans v. Gunnip
case is to be found in the fallowing language:
"It may be true that Evans did not enter into
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an. agree1~1ent not to _compete. However, the
evidence is that he did endeavor with somr>
succe~s to _pursuade t~ose clie!1ts. of the pai·tn_ersh1p with whom his association was parbc~larly close to remain wi~h the partnership.
I~ is also ~fact ~hat he advised Gunnip at the
~ime of dissolut10n that he was not intend.
mg to compete and has not done so since that
time."
Therefore, Mr. Jackson, unlike Mr. Evans, did
not refrain from competing; did not urge clients
to stay with Mr. Caldwell and his associates; but
has competed in all respects and has solicited the
clients and accounts for his firm of Jackson, Maxwell & Company. Mr. Caldwell, on the other hand,
unlike Mr. Gunnip, has properly and timely accounted to plaintiff, has not solicited and taken the entirety of the clients of the former partnership, but
refrained from solicitation pursuant to his agreement with Mr. Jackson, and, in at least one casr,
actively urged a client to go with Mr. Jackson and
his new partner, Paul J. Maxwell. (Exhibit D-46).
The plaintiff in his brief makes much of the
fact that Mr. Jackson in the period following Mr.
Messina's death became unable to render effectil'e
service to clients and accounts, and therefore, so
the plaintiff reasons, Mr. Caldwell took advantage
of a situation feeling that Mr. Jackson would be
unable to take any clients with him in spite of the
fact that the clients and accounts were not to be
solicited. In fact, plaintiff contends that Mr. Cald·
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well calculatingly sat down and computed just what
clients would continue to do business with Mr. Cald\Yrll, and his associates. This, of course, is not the
p\'idence ( R. 246 to 249, inclusive). The evidence
is clear that while during the period between the
time Mr. Caldwell gave notice to Mr. Jackson on
April 3, 1961, and the actual termination of the
l)artnership
on March 31, 1962, Mr. Caldwell occa1
siunally discussed with his secretary where a particular account might go, no attempt was ever made
to make a complete study or computation on this
matter to determine how much in gross or how many
clients Mr. Caldwell and his associates would keep
and how much in gross or how many clients Mr.
Jackson would keep. Furthermore, the evidence is
clear that any appraisal made by Mr. Caldwell, or
by his secretary, in this regard was as often as not
in error. (R. 246, 247, 248, 249, 267).

The most telling argument in this case against
assigning any good will to the old partnership of
Messina, Jackson, Caldwell & Co., is the undisputed
fact that the accounts did not tend to go with either
of the partners, but rather tended to follow the
particular employee of said partnership that had
been se1·ving that client or account. (R. 267). The
fact that more of the clients and accounts ended up
with the new firm of Caldwell, Nielson, Campbell
& Co., then ended up with Jackson, Maxwell & Co.,
resulted from the fact that more of the employees
:ind limited partners of the firm of Messina, Jack29

son, Caldwell~ Co.,, who.had actually been doing thP
work of the clients busmess, chose to go with Mr.
Caldwell than chose to go with Mr. Jackson. Two
of the individuals working directly on accounts,
Paul J. Maxwell and Reed A. Beck, went with Mr.
Jackson. On the other hand, nine of the individuals
performing work on the clients' records, Lowell D.
Nielson, Loyd J. Campbell, Melvin E. Hill, Jr.,
Charles H. Foote, Jr., Leon H. Jackson, Charles
Lowe, James B. Ostler, Lenore Bateman, and Mr.
Caldwell himself, ended up with the firm of Caldwell, Nielson, Campbell & Company. It is quite
natural and logical, therefore, that more of the business ended up with Mr. Caldwell's new firm. It
must also be recognized that a great many more
people had to earn their living fro mthe proceeds
of the clients that went with Mr. Caldwell than had
to earn their living from the proceeds of the clients
that went with Mr. Jackson, and these individuals
that had to earn a living from the firm on the basis
of actual hours expended were the particular individuals to whom the loyalties of the clients were
attached ( R. 268 and 269). Only 22.2 % of the income which came to the new firm (compared to
27.5% of the income of the old firm) was paid to
Mr. Caldwell, as is shown by Exhibit D-47.
It is an undisputed fact that plaintiff took

more clients and accounts with him in his new
partnership with Mr. Maxwell than were ever identified with him at any time he was a partner of
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Messina, Jackson, Caldwall & Company, one of
which, State Line Hotel, Inc., was one of the largest
accounts said Company had and was being serviced
at the time by Reed Beck who also went with Mr.
Jackson and Mr. Maxwell (Exhibit D-33)
It is also an undisputed fact that in January
1962, Paul J. Maxwell endeavored to employ certain of the secretaries away from the old firm to
join him in his new venture with Mr. Jackson (R.
614) and prior to March 31, 1962, received files
and working papers of accounts to be serviced by
Jackson, Maxwell & Company (Exhibit D-16). Reference is also made to receipts on letter head stationary of Jackson, Maxwell & Company, all of which
refer to the old partnership as "the former firm of
Messina, Jackson, Caldwell & Company" (Exhibit
D-16) as additional evidence that the old firm had
terminated in conformity with the intention and
acts of the parties.
Mr. Charles H. Foote, Jr., an employee of the
old firm of Messina, Jackson, Caldwell & Company,

also testified that had he not joined Mr. Caldwell's
new firm of Caldwell, Nielson, Campbell & Company on April 1, 1962, but had gone elsewhere, he
could also have taken with him certain of the accuunts of the old firm on which he had been working. (R. 592).
Under these circumstances, it is extremely difficult to see how any a ward could be made in this
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case for partnership good will because: (a) 110 at
tempt was made to divide the clients, but it was
agreed that each was to be allowed to go where he
pleased without coercion, however, subtle; (b) tht~
attachment of the clients proved to be not to tlw
firm, but rather to the individual employee of the
firm who was doing the actual work on the client's
books; and ( c) plaintiff continued on as an accountant and serving many of the clients.
Defendants submit that the holding of the lower
court must be affirmed.
POINT II
THE WORK IN PROCESS AS OF MARCH 31, 1%2,
HAS BEEN PROPERLY DETERMINED BY THE
TRIAL COURT AND FULLY ACCOUNTED FOR BY
THE DEFENDANTS.

Plaintiff contends that the Court erred in failing to require defendants to account to plaintiff for
the value of work in process on March 31, 1962, based
upon the proximate investment in such work in
process prior to said date. It is the position of plainti'ff that he is entitled to share in fees received
from clients whose work was in process on March
31, 1962, based upon the total proportionate investment made in the fee compared with the investment made in the fee after the effective termination date. Plaintiff states that the results obtained
by defendants was accomplished by design rath~r
than application of accounting theory. An anal~s 1 ~
of the matter can only lead to the conclusion that
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plaintiff's theories as to the allocation of work in
process are erroneous. Plaintiff's theories in this
regard were based upon Exhibit P-23 and the testimony of Mr. Karl J. Maxwell with respect thereto
R. 478 to 482, inclusive).
1
It is not possible for defendants to cover this

point in one or two paragraphs by simply applying percentage factors to totals, as in the case of
plaintiff, but a review of the evidence is necessary
in order to properly apprise the Court of the proper
procedures followed.
Said Exhibit P-14 is the original schedule prepared under the direction of Defendant, Grant R.
Caldwell, showing thereon the proper allocation of
work in process with respect to each client as of
March 31, 1962, as between the old firm of Messina,
Jackson, Caldwell & Co., which terminated as of
~Tarch 31, 1962, and Caldwell, Nielson, Campbell
&Company. Some accounting work was performed
by the old firm of Messina, Jackson, Caldwell &
Company prior to March 31, 1962, as to certain
clients, but which was completed after March 31,
1962, by the firm of Caldwell, Nielson, Campbell &
Company.
The proper method of allocation of said work
in process with respect to each client as between
the two firms, and as in fully set forth and shown
in said Exhibit P-14, may be summarized as follows:

(a) Each firm first recovers actual travel ex33

penses (hotel, meals, taxi, air tra .. 1
etc.) from the total billings as show;c,1
columns 4 and 7 of said Exhibit P-14. 1J
( b) The percentage ~f accountants' time
charges for both. firms as to each client
w~s then detern:med and the amount ap.
phcable to Messma, Jackson, Caldwell &
Company, was set forth in column 13 of
said Exhibit P-14.

( c) The respective percentages were then applied to the remainder of the billino
(after deducting the travel expenses rr:
ferred to in paragraph (a) above) f~r
each client in order to determine each
firm's fair and proper share of the fee
earned, and the amount applicable tn
Messina, J ac~son, Caldwell & Company,
as to each client, was shown in column ·
14 of said Exhibit P-14.
Plaintiff's examination of said Exhibit P-14,
resulted in one objection only, and this was to the
fact that certain of the partners' and employees'
time charges were increased by the firm of Caldwell, Nielson, Campbell & Company subsequent to
March 31, 1962, and plaintiff contended that unless the fee billings were increased proportionately
to the increase in accountants' and employees' time
charges made subsequent to March 31, 1962, that
the increased time charges, as reflected in sai<l Exhibit P-14, would distort the allocation of the work
in process in favor of said Caldwell, Nielson, Ca111pbell & Company ( R. 481 and 482) .
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Defendants thereafter prepared Exhibit D-32,
,rhich reflects a readjustment of the increased ac(nuntants' time charges used in said Exhibit P-14,
Jiac:k to the lower rates charged prior to March 31,
1'.1G2, so that all of the accountants' time charges
utilized in both Exhibits P-14 and D-32, were on
the same basis in all respects. The results of the
rccomputation as shown in said Exhibit D-32, indicates an additional sum of $1,105.72, in plaintiff's
favor over and above the sum computed to be owing
to plaintiff as set forth in Defendants' Accounting
(Exhibit P-15) furnished to plaintiff in July of
1963, which sum has been in a trust account for
plaintiff since that time. However, the recomputation shown in said Exhibit D-32, does not take into
account the increased fees resulting from the higher
billing rates of said Caldwell, Nielson, Campbell &
Company subsequent to March 31, 1962, which,
when propel'ly applied to the computations, confirms
defendants' original allocation of the work in process as shown in said Exhibit P-14 (and as applied
in paragraph ( c) above referred to) as being compl?tely proper, fair and equitable.
Defendants' said Exhibit D-32 corrected the
one objection plaintiff made to said Exhibit P-14,
and applied therein plaintiff's own theory as used
in plamtiff's Exhibit P-23, but sets forth the actual
cletci.ils with respect to each account on an individual
il1sis rather than arbitrarily and erroneously apply. percentages to totals as Mr. Maxwell did in his
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computations set forth in said Exhibit P-23.
Plaintiff's said Exhibit P-23, reflecting plain.
tiff's own theory of allocation of the WOl"k in process, and now plaintiff's new computations under
Point IV of his Brief, are erroneous, improper and
misleading for the fallowing reasons:
( 1) Travel expenses are given the same
weight in Plaintiff's allocation of the
work in process as the accountant's time
charges. This procedure imposes in the
computations an underlying theory that
an accounting form is entitled to a "profit" on travel expenses which conflicts
with all sound reasoning, proper accounting principles and economic justification.
(2) Mr. Karl Maxwell included as a part of
Plaintiff's Exhibit P-23 a schedule showing the percentage increase in time
charges between the hourly rates of the
firm of Messina, Jackson, Caldwell &
Company before March 31, 1962, and the
firm of Caldwell, Nielson, Campbell &
Company after March 31, 1962. However Mr. Maxwell completely failed and
negl~cted to take into account in his computations the time of certain of the accountants for which there was no change
in time rates either before or after March
31, 1962, as follows:
Mr. Leon H. Jackson
Mr. Charles E. Lowe
Mr. Ray Jensen
Mr. Al Smith
( 3) Mr. Kar 1 Maxwell also erroneously ap
3fi

plied the percentage change in billing
i·ates (as he arbitrarily and erroneously
deten11ined it in Schedule B-1 of said
Exhibit P-23) to total costs for all clients
rather than to each client on an individual basis. This procedure completely
violates proper accounting principles and
erroneously applies an averaging concept
to the computations which should not
and does not, apply when all of the details are available to make a proper and
correct computation as is set forth in Exhibit P-14 and Exhibit D-32.
(4) Mr. Karl Maxwell also erroneously applied the percentage relationship of costs
for each firm to the billings in total rather than to each individual client's billing.
The error and inequity of this procedure
may be illustrated as follows:
The very first named client listed in
Exhibits P-14 and D-32, is as follows:
Client

Edward Abrahams

Fee
(Column 9)

$50.00

Time and
Expense
CNC&C
(Columns
6, 7, 8)

Time and
Expense
MJC&C
(Columns
3, 4, 5)

$55.00 (D-32)
$66.00 (P-14)
Mr. Karl Maxwell erroneously and
improperly applied 54.344 % (as
shown in his Exhibit P-23) to the
above $50.00 billing and erroneousNone
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ly and arbitrarily allocates the
of $27.17, to the firm of Mess~urn
J ac k son, ca.ld well & Companv'
ll1:t
whereas no time nor exr)enses 1 ~:
lau
.
. d b
.
been mcur~
e y that firm with respect to this .account prior to Man.:h
3~, 1962. This procedure complete!:
v10lates ~roper accoun~ing principle~
and apph~s an averagmg concept to
totals which should not, and does
not, apply when all details are available to Il:!ake a proper and correct
co~puta~10n on an individual client
basis as is set forth in said Exhibit~
P-14 and D-32.

1

It can readily be seen that the computations
of Mr. Maxwell in Exhibit P-23, as well as those of
plaintiff in his Brief, are erroneous and misleading under any theory. Mr. Maxwell's schedule showing the percentage increase in time charges between
the old firm before March 31, 1962, and the new
firm after March 31, 1962, completely fails to take
into account the time of four accountants for which
there was no change in time rates either before or
after March 31, 1962. His application of the percentage relationship of costs to the billings in total
gives the old firm the sum of $27.17 with respect ,
to the Edward Abrahams account, and no time nor
expense had been incurred b ythe old firm regard·
ing this account prior to March 31, 1962. This type
of inequity results from dealing in totals rather
than on an individual client basis.
The lower Court held that the division of the

1

1
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in process of the old partnership as of March
;~L 1~)62, on an individual client basis as shown
and set forth in said Exhibit D-32, was proper, fair
,1nrl equitable. Said Exhibit D-32, was also prepared
to allow each firm to recover actual travel expenses
from the total billings prior to the application of
the determined percentages to the remainder of
the billing in order to compute each firm's fair
:me! proper share of the fee earned. However, it is
to be remembered that the computation shown in
said Exhibit D-32 does not take into account the
increased fees resulting from the higher billing
rates of the new firm subsequent to March 31, 1962,
which, when applied to the computations as shown
in Exhibit P-14, confirms defendants' original allccation of the work in process as shown in said
Exhibit P-14 as being reasonable, proper, fair and
e11L\itable.
1'he differences between the amounts due plaintiff for work in process as shown by said Exhibits
P-11 and D-32 are not great and defendants respectfully submit that the lower Court's ruling with
respect to this matter should be affirmed in all
respr·cts.
11-ork

POINT III

'rHE AGREEMENT OF MARCH 7,

1960, WAS
FULLY CONSIDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT AND
FINDINGS MADE THAT NO ACCOUNTING WAS REQl'IFtED BY SAID AGREEMENT AND NO DAMAGES
lfAVE ACCRUED AS NO BREACH THEREOF OCr'T'RRED.

Plaintiff is completely erroneous in stating that
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the trial court ref used to make any Findings of
Fact or Conclusions of Law with respect to the isst.
involved in this cause of action. The court proper;~
found in its Finding of Fact under paragraph 8,
thereof, that the parties executed said agreement of
March 7, 1960, (Exhibit P-5) as well as an agreement dated April 21, 1961, (Exhibit D-35) but that
there was no requirement upon the parties to ac- ,
count under said agreements, or any combination
thereof ( R. 193 and 200). The court also found in
its Finding of Fact under paragraph 24, thereof,
that defendants did no violate or breach any agreement, or agreements, with plaintiff, and further
that there was no evidence that plaintiff became
disabled on April 1, 1962. (R. 193).
Plaintiff never requested the lower court to
make any additional findings. Plaintiff requested
defendants to stipulate that he could have additional
time in which to object to the trial court's Findings
and Judgment and such stipulation was executed
and the trial court did enter its order granting
plaintiff the requested additional time. (R. 207 and
208). Plaintiff thereafter, and on his own Motion,
had the court set aside said Stipulation and Order.
(R. 211).
Plaintiff's failure to object to trial court findings is, of course, not a waiver of failure to find
on a material issue, if such was actually the case,
but is is submitted that such is not the case and
the rule that findings must be liberally construed
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in support of judgment is particularly applicable
in absence of a request for more specific findings.

Said agreement of March 7, 1960, (Exhibit
P-3) provided that:
"Effective April 1, 1962, amendments to
the present partnership agrement are to be
entered into incorporating in the document
the agreement in 3 above, together with other
conditions and agreements mutually acceptable to the parties."
It must be concluded that it was in some respects nothing more than an agreement to negotiate
and agree at some future time. It must also be concluded that the parties could not legally modify said
agreement of April 1, 1958, amended as of April 1,
1969, the last partnership agreement entered into
\rith Mr. Messina, and under which the parties
oprrated up to March 31, 1962, without the consent
and joinder of the Messina Estate thereto:
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 48-1-28,
with respect to partnerships, provides:
"Causes of dissolution. Dissolution is
caused:
( 1) \Vithout violation of the agreement between the partners :
(a) By the termination of the definite
term or particular undertaking specified in the agreement.
( b) By the express will of any partner
when no definite term or particular
undertaking is specified * * *"
41

.In addition to the fact that the agreement of
April 1, 1958, amended as of April 1, 1959 (Exhil't
P-4) provided for the termination of the
ship on March 31, 1962, it must also be concedpc)
that defendants gave plaintiff proper notice of the
termination of the partnership by instrument datrrl
April 3, 1961. (Exhibit P-11). Plaintiff was thetefore properly and lawfully notified that any part.
nership relationship among the parties would terminate as of March 31, 1962.

paitn::.:

The significant part of the March 7, 1960,
agreement is found in the following language:
"In the event of the death or permanent
disability of any of the parties hereto, this
agreement shall become null and void insofar
as the deceased or disabled party is concerned,
and his partnership participation shall be in
accordance with Articles VIII, IX and X of
the partnership agreement of Messina, Jackson, Caldwell & Company dated April 1, 1058, '
amended as of April 1, 1959, * * *".
It would appear that said agreement, if it in
fact accomplished anything, simply reinstated the
disability provision set forth in the agreement dnterl
April 1, 1958, (Exhibit P-3) which was eliminated
from the agreement dated April 1, 1958, amended
as of April 1, 1959. (Exhibit P-4). Plaintiff ha\'ing
been notified that the partnership relationship wou~cl
terminate in all respects as of March 31, 1962, said
agreement of March 7, 1960, only becomes signi- '
1

12

fic:rnt if plaintiff become permanently disabled prior
tu March :31, 1962.

A composite of the pertinent part of Article IX
of the agreement of April 1, 1958, amended as of
.\pril 1, 1959, (Exhibit P-4) taking into account
:he reinstatement of the disability provision removed by the parties therefrom, is as follows:
"Article IX.
In the event of the death (or permanent
disability) of Marco Messina, A. Rulon Jackson or Grant R. Caldwell, the estate or heirs
of the decent shall be entitled to the same
participation between the date of death (or
permanent disability) and the effective date
of termination of the partnership as provided
in Article VI above as the decedent would
have received had he continued to live and
participate in the partnership."
By reason of the partnership being on a fiscal
year basis, if plaintiff became permanently disabled
Letween August 16, 1959, the date of Mr. Messina's
death, and March 7, 1960, he woul dhave been entitled to receive his percentage participation (27.5
per cent) in the partnership profits for the fiscal
year ending March 31, 1960, and for two full fiscal
yrars thereafter, or until March 31, 1962, at which
time his interest in the partnership would have
terminated. It is undisputed that plaintiff has already received this amount.
Plaintiff states in his brief that "some time
beforr March 7, 1960, the date of the 1960 agree43

ment, and March 31, 1962, plaintiff became total]\· ,
and ~ermanently disabled insofar as his ability t;
funct10n as a public accountant was concel'ned"
plaintiff contends that the evidence reasonably fix~s
the date of this incapacity as the spring of 1961.
I'f plaintiff became incapacitated in January 01
1961, he would have been entitled to receive his per
centage participation (27.5 per cent) in the partnership profits for the fiscal year ending March 31,
1961, and for two full fiscal years thereafter m·
until March 31, 1963. It is undisputed that he' received his full share of partnership profits right
up to March 31, 1962.
1

Under the circumstances, it is just as logical
and reasonable to assume that plaintiff became disabled in March of 1960 as in January of 1961. Furthermore, it is just as logical and reasonable to
assume that plaintiff did not become disabled until
after April 1, 1962, and before June of 1963, when
he was first examined by Dr. Moench. Plaintiff's
actions belie his permanent disability prior to April
1, 1962.
It is submitted that plaintiff completely failed :
to sustain his burden of proof with respect to any i
permanent disability prior to March 31, 1962, an~
the trial court properly held that there was no ev:·
dence that plaintiff became disabled prior to April
1 1962 and that none of the parties were under
' obligation
'
any
to account under said agreement.
In this respect, Dr. Moench testified that l1l'
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e:-;amined M1·. Jackson on two occasions, July, 1963,
;!lld December, 1963. ( R. 335). He further testified
that his diagnosis of Mr. Jackson's illness was senile
µsychotic reaction, presumably due to an aging process so that the person eventually loses his usual
contact with reality (R. 336) ; that it was impossible
to pinpoint a time when this began and "it is in
general a permanent and progressive condition"
(R. 336) ; and that based upon his first examination
of Mr. Jackson in July of 1963, he "couldn't tell
whether he was incompetent or not in January of
1961" and that he had no way of knowing whether
he (Mr. Jackson) was disabled a year prior to the
date he first saw him. (R. 342). Dr. Moench also
testified that there was no way of telling how long
Mr. Jackson's illness had been in progress. (R. 341).
Mrs. Jackson attempted to pinpoint January of
1961 as the beginning date of Mr. Jackson's illness
(R 307). She testified that he was struck by a car
as a pedestrian and carried some 15 or 20 feet in
.July of 1963 (R. 310); that as of January 1961,
he wasn't right up to par, but that she didn't think
he was totally disabled (R. 311); that she felt he
became disabled on March 13, 1961 (R. 311); and
she also testified that she could not give a date when
Mr. Jackson became disabled and on April 1, 1962,
she helped set up an accounting practice for him.
(R. 312). Mrs. Jackson also testified that as late
as the date of trial of this case on December 1, 1964,
.. ~ ' * he (Mr. Jackson) leaves to go down to the
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office in the morning about eight or eight-thirty
and he comes back home about one or one-thirtr
* * * " clearly indicating that approximately tw~ 1
and one-half years after March 31, 1962, he was
still going to his office each day. ( R. 304).
Mr. F. H. Carlton, one of plaintiff's witnesses,
testified that he couldn't say Mr. Jackson was incompetent on April 1, 1962, and that he should haw
been able to carry on an accounting practice as
of that date. (R. 303). Paul J. Maxwell apparently
had no misgivings about forming a business l'ela".
tionship with Mr. Jackson in January, 1962.
Apparently Mr. Roy W. Simmons, President of
Keystone Insurance & Investment Co., did not feel
that plaintiff was permanently disabled when he requested Mr. Caldwell to release to Mr. Jackson
"all of my personal files, Adams & Sons Company
files, and Keystone files", by letter directed to Mr.
Caldwell dated April 9, 1962 (Exhibit D-16). Reference is also made to the many receipts for files,
working papers, etc., executed by Mr. Jackson subsequent to April 1, 1962, one of which was dated
November 16, 1962 (Exhibit D-16), in comparisun
to Mrs. Jackson's testimony that he could not write
his name in October 1961 (R. 305) and could nnt
write his name on a check in January 19Gl (R
407).
At the trial, and even though defendants con·
tended and the trial court subsequently held lk11

was no evidence to sustain plaintiff's permanent disability on or prior to March 31, 1962, defrnclants offered to stipulate that plaintiff became
tlisabled in January, 1961, and that he was entitled
tc' a pay-ont under the same clause of the contract
under which the Messina Estate was paid. Plaintiff
refused to enter into such stipulation. (R. 520 and
tliet'l:'

-rJl) .

;).;,.

The amount which plaintiff would have received if permanent disability had occurred in January, 1961, was computed by defendants and received in evidence as Exhibit D-30. Said Exhibit shows
the amount of $29,17 4.08 would be owing to Mr.
Jackson based upon the hypothesis that he became
permanently disabled in January, 1961. (R. 532 to
586, inclusive). Said amount of $29,17 4.08 includes
the money held in trust for Mr. Jackson in the
amount of $25,755.47, pursuant to the accounting
heretofore furnished to him by Mr. Caldwell (Exhibit P-15), but it does not take into account the
loss of an amount in excess of $20,000 in fees with
respect to those clients who chose to go with and
be served by Mr. Jackson, Maxwell & Company prior
to and subsequent to April 1, 1962. (R. 535). Had
plaintiff timely asserted such disability and not
competed for the clients, it is reasonable to assume
that most of the clients who chose to go with Mr.
Jackson would have remained with defendants.
Plaintiff failed to assert any disability but solicited
the clients and eagerly participated in the division
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of partnership assets on March 31, 1962, to C'()Jt.
tinue in business with Paul J. Maxwell to sel'vice
those clients and accounts who chose to go with them
rather than remain with defendants.
The computation of the amount due Mr. Jack.
son under the hypothesis that he became permanent.
ly disabled in January, 1961, as shown in said Ex.
hibit D-30, also included all of the income of the
accounts of Mr. Nicholas Rhodes, who was an incoming partner to the new firm of Caldwell, Nielson, Campbell & Company on April 1, 1962, which
accounts were merged in that firm ( R. 533), in
3,ddi ti on to all of the other new business develo1Jerl
by th new firm between March 31, 1962, and March
31, 1963, none of which plaintiff was entitled to
participate in under the partnership agreement.
As above stated, the computation in said fa.
hibit D-30 does not take into account the loss of
something in excess of $20,000 in fees to the ne\\'
firm by reason of the loss of clients who chose to go
with Mr. Jackson. In order that the computations
with respect to these clients could have been proper·
ly con·elated in said Exhibit D-30 to arrive at ~
complete picture of the situation an accounting
thereof should have been prepared by Mr . .Jackson.
This, he has refused to do.
Defendants suggest that by reason of plaintiff
failing to assert any disability benefits, under ar'.l'
agreement, on March 31, 1962; that by reason of Ins
acquiesence in the division of the assets of the old
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the time of the termination thereof; that by
rt'aso11 of his entrring into a business relationship
\rith Paul J. Maxwell three months prior to March
31. 10G2, in effect being a member of both partners;11ps at the same time, and soliciting accounts to
Jw sen'icecl by Mr. Maxwell, and Jackson, Maxwell
e,, Company subsequent to March 31, 1962; that by
reason of his complete failure to render an accounti11g· to Ml'. Caldwell with respect to the accounts who
chose to go with Jackson, Maxwell & Company, or
with respect to any of his theories of liability in
this law suit; that by reason of plaintiff's actions
being completely inconsistent with any theory of
liability based upon permanent disability; that by
re:isnn of there being no realistic evidence that
plaintif was permanently disabled on March 31,
1962, 01· at any time prim· thereto; that plaintiff
h~n effectively abandoned all rights, if any, that
he had unde1· the Ma1·ch 7, 1960, agreement and
should be precluded from asserting any rights at
this junctm·e.
[ti i11 '.11

Acklitionally, and in light of the foregoing, it
is most difficult to conceive how defendants could
b~ charged with any liability based upon the amount
of formula damages provided in Article X of the
Exhibit P-4, when there is no evidence that Mr.
.Jackson \Vas permanently disabled on March 31,
Hl62 and no disability benefit was ever asserted by
him at any time; he recognized and operated pur~uant to the provisions of the 1959 agreement (Ex49

hibit P-4) right up to March 31, 1962, and received
all of the benefits to which he was entitled thereunder; prior to March 31, 1962, he was setting up
with Paul Maxwell in the Judge Building and sub.
sequent to March 31, 1962, he was busily engageri
with Paul J. Maxwell in servicing those clients who
chose to go with him rather than remain with Mr.
Caldwell and his associates. As late as August, 1962
he was still busily engaged in pursuing his accounting practice in Utah, Idaho, Nevada, and Wyoming,
as evidenced by an article appearing on page 27 of
the "Intermountain Industry" magazine received in
evidence as Exhibit D-48, setting forth the status
of the situation and representing to the public that
Jackson, Maxwell & Company had been and still
was in business.
I

Defendants submit that under the facts the
lower court's holding that none of the parties wel'e
obligated to account under said agreement of March
7, 1960, should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff seeks equitable relief but has not him·
self done that which is fair and equitable. He cannot
claim the defendants did not deal fairly with him. He
was as anxious and interested in continuing in the
accounting business on March 31, 1962, as we~·e
the defendants. Both plaintiff's new partnership
with Mr. Maxwell and defendants' new partnership
are completely different from the old partnership.
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of the pal'ties effectively abandoned the old partnr,rship entity on March 31, 1962, and neither of
the new partnerships have any actual privy with
the old terminated partnership. There was no continuity of the old partnership entity after March 31,
1962, and there was no duty upon either plaintiff
or defendants to preserve the good will, if any, of
the old partnership. There is nothing in the record
from which it appears that the plaintiff has been
precluded from preserving, on his own behalf, any
ralue in the alleged good will of the old partnership,
if he desired to do so, purely personal reasons alone
excepted. That he had full opportunity to do so is
clear from the record. The situation is not one where
it can be said that the defendants have converted
any property consisting of good will to their own
use so that they would be accountable to plaintiff
fnr the alleged value thereof. Under the facts and
~ircumstances of this case, the value of the good
will. if any, must lie where it falls.
jll

The work in process allocation as proposed by
plaintiff will not achieve a fair division thereof
between the parties. The procedure utilized by Mr.
Caldwell is the only fair method to arrive at an
equitable division of this asset. The application of
percentage factors to totals, as proposed by plaintiff, is contrary to accounting principles and most
certainly should never be considered as a solution
when the pertinent and necessary information is
rr~dily available to consumate the division on an
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individual client-account basis as is set forth in Exhibits P-14 and D-32.
Defendants never breached the agreement of
March 7, 1960, or, as a matter of fact, any agreement, and therefore, plaintiff is not entitled to anv
damages under any theory flowing therefrom. At
the time of the termination of the old partnership
on March 31, 1962, plaintiff never asserted that he
was entitled to any disability benefits of any kind
or nature and his actions prior to and subsequent
to March 31, 1962, are completely inconsistent with
any of his asserted rights for disability benefits
under the March 7, 1960, agreement. Plaintiff is
late at this time in asserting disability benefits not
asserted at the time of the termination of the partnership and division of its assets on March 31, 1962.
Furthermore, the evidence is absolutely clear that
plaintiff was not permanently disabled on March 31,
1962, or at any time prior thereto, in order fur
him to have been entitled to receive any additional
pay-out after March 31, 1962, by reason of any disability under the agreement of March 7, 1960.
This court has consistently held that in this
type of a case it reviews questions generally in light
most favorable to findings of the trial court, and
reverses only if the evidence or lack of it renders
it clearly necessary to do so.
A careful review of the record can only learl to
the conclusion that plaintiff completely failed tn
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sustain the burden of proof as to any of his causes
of aetion and the judgment of the lower court as to
tlw rights of the parties an dthe final consummation of the old partnership affairs should be affirmed in all respects.

Respectfully submitted,

EDWARD M. BOWN
515 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

PUGSLEY, HAYES, RAMPTON &
WATKISS
315 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for
Defendants-Respondents
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